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ABSTRACT 
In most cases, gamma radiation is the dominant dose contributor, but in specific configurations, neutron 
radiation can become significant for the overall dose rate. This occurs for canister storages where the amount of 
spent fuel is large and thick concrete shields or entry mazes are used for radiation protection. The design of the 
cask is based on the safety requirements for normal storage conditions under 10 CFR Part 72. A radiation 
shielding analysis of the spent fuel storage cask optimized for loading design basis fuels was performed for a 
single cask. For the single cask, dose rates at the external surface of the spent fuel storage cask, some distance 
away from the cask surface, were evaluated. The results of the shielding analysis for the single cask show that 
dose rates were considerably higher at the lower side (from the bottom of the cask to the bottom of the neutron 
shielding) of the cask. However, this is not considered to be a significant issue since additional shielding will be 
installed at the storage facility. The shielding analysis results showed exponential decrease with distance off the 
sources. The controlled area boundary was calculated to be approximately 280m from the array, with a dose rate 
of 20 mrem/yr. Actual dose rates within the controlled area boundary would be lower than 25mrem/yr, due to the 
decay of radioactivity of spent fuel in storage. Another finding of the study is that the burnup distribution of the 
spent fuel needs to be taken into account when assessing the yield of the neutron radiation source, because use of 
the assembly average burnup leads to underestimation of it. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The pools that were designed initially for short-term storage have now become quasi-permanent storages 
because of the recent prohibition on the reprocessing of spent fuel. Wet storage needs special care to maintain 
good water chemistry pH-values, chloride and sulphate impurity concentrations and conductivity. Currently, 
concrete canisters identical to the Point Lepreau's dry storage system are in use for an interim storage of spent 
fuels at Wolsong nuclear power plant unit (a CANDU-PHWR). A major factor in spent fuel dry storage design 
and one of the key thermal safety issues for licensing a spent fuel dry storage system is dissipation of the residual 
heat generated by the spent fuel. That is, the spent fuel temperature in a dry storage canister must be kept below 
160 °C to avoid fuel oxidation [1]. 
 
In the storage cask method fuel is stored in units, which are self-shielding, cooling and protecting. Each cask is a 
hollow reinforced concrete cylinder sitting on a concrete base. The spent fuel is contained in a steel can at the 
center of the cylinder, with possibly a thin lead layer between the fuel can and the concrete walls. In this 
application, natural draft air circulation through an annulus between the shield and the fuel can was necessary to 
remove the heat being generated at the design rate. 
 
The geometry and shape of fuel assemblies (cylindrical or spherical) is an important parameter in the design of 
casks. The arrangement of fuel elements in a fuel assembly is a major concern in the design of cask. The cask 
physical layout is evaluated in the perspective of fuel elements arrangement. Heat transfer models and shielding 
design greatly vary with the arrangement of fuel elements. The design of cask should be compatible with the 
environmental conditions (wind velocity, humidity, temperature etc.). The geological factors are to be considered 
which include natural disasters like earthquakes, storms etc [2, 3]. 
 
The design of casks shall be such that when they are loaded with fuel, the external radiation fields do not exceed 
the criteria or limits recommended. Loading and unloading of spent fuel into casks, silos or vaults in a storage 
configuration shall be done using equipment and methods designed to limit skyshine and the reflection of 
radiation towards uncontrolled areas, in accordance with the ALARA principle. 
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The design of fuel baskets or canisters intended for use with casks and the design of the casks within which the 
fuel baskets or canisters are to be placed, shall ensure that the fuel will remain in a configuration that has been 
predetermined to be subcritical during loading, storage and retrieval [4]. 
 
The design of dry fuel storage facilities should allow for any consequences likely to result from the redistribution 
or the introduction of a moderator as a consequence of an internal or external event. If sub-criticality under these 
conditions cannot be assured, then arguments should concentrate on why they are unlikely. This requires 
substantial consideration of site conditions with supporting analysis and/or demonstration that the stored fuel can 
remain effectively isolated from the external environment. 
 
The cask shall be adequately constructed of suitable materials, using appropriate design and construction 
methods, to maintain shielding and containment functions under the environmental and loading conditions 
expected during its design lifetime unless adequate maintenance and/or replacement during operation can be 
demonstrated. The design of concrete or metal casks shall incorporate containment barriers acceptable to the 
Regulatory Body. Containment barriers to prevent the release of radionuclides include liners that might form 
integral parts of the cask structures [5]. 
MATERIALS AND METHODSFor the shielding analysis, independent analyses for source terms and 
shielding are required. To perform these analyses, proper tools could be chosen such as ORIGEN2.1, ORIKAN, 
MCNP, QAD, DORT, SCALE, etc. It is also important to do decay heat estimation for the spent fuel after it has 
been cooled for a certain period of time in the wet storage pool, is calculated for a fuel bundle. This determined 
heat load is then used in further calculations. In order to carry out criticality assessment of the facility, the 
multiplication factor has been calculated for the dry storage and in accident conditions. For this purpose the two 
computer codes are usually used [6]: 
 
 WIMS-D/4: generates the necessary group constants for the homogenized cell and for the materials. 
 CITATION: calculates the infinite multiplication factor for the assembly. 
 SCALE 4.4: used on the spent fuel nuclide composition calculation with the core operating parameters, 
and the keff  calculation. 
 
A major factor in spent fuel dry storage design and one of the key thermal safety issues for licensing a spent fuel 
dry storage system is dissipation of the residual heat generated by the spent fuel. That is, the spent fuel 
temperature in a dry storage canister must be kept below 160°C to avoid fuel oxidation. In order to evaluate the 
maximum fuel rod temperature in the canister under design conditions, one may need to solve a multi-
dimensional heat transfer problem with an extremely complicated geometry where three modes of heat transfer 
are superimposed [7]. 
 
Two types of cask basket structure are considered for criticality control. The basket using boral is a stainless 
steel honeycomb structure with rectangular fuel load cells and poison (boral) plates attached to their outside 
surfaces. Boral as a neutron absorbing material is mechanically attached to the cells such that the fuel assemblies 
are fully surrounded by the neutron absorbing material. The neutron absorbing material extends the full height of 
the active fuel. The boral contains the B-10 content. The other type of basket uses borated stainless steel (BSS) 
as a basket structure material. This basket consists of interlocking flat BSS plates which form square fuel load 
cells, and a loaded fuel shares the plate walls of basket fuel cell with adjacent fuels [8]. 
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Figure 1:  General layout of the spent fuel cask  
 
Most countries use helium as the storage atmosphere, although both air and helium are used in Canada, while 
South Korea uses an air atmosphere only. The best worldwide summary of light water reactor-related 
temperature limit determination for inert dry storage of spent fuel assemblies was published by EPRI [9]: 
cladding creep from internal gas overpressure constitutes the rate-determining degradation and failure 
mechanism for setting maximum allowable storage temperature limits in dry inert storage. If creep were allowed 
to proceed to rupture, the fracture mode would most likely be of a pinhole type. Nevertheless, it is desirable to 
avoid any degradation. This can be accomplished by confining the creep degradation mechanism to its primary 
and early secondary stages. If it can be shown that creep strain never exceeds that critical strain domain during 
inert dry storage, tertiary creep and subsequent fuel rod defection can be ruled out. The inner shell is usually of 
forged carbon steel or stainless steel material. It is provided as a containment barrier for fission products. It also 
serves as a shielding material against gamma and neutrons as well as it helps in the removal of decay heat from 
the spent fuel. It also provides the structural support to the spent fuel assembly. 
 
There are two types of shielding materials required: one for the fast neutrons and the other for gamma radiations. 
Fast neutrons are highly energetic particles and give a large dose in a little exposure. So, their shielding is of 
major concern. Gamma rays are highly penetrating radiations and can not be stopped completely but can be 
attenuated to a safe limit. Thus, there are two types of shields used in a cask; neutron shield and gamma shield.  
Concrete is the most widely used neutron shield. Usually, reinforced concrete is used to give structural strength 
to the cask and provide for the time-dependent degradation. Stainless steel is also used as a neutron shield but it 
faces a problem of “neutron streaming”. Hydrogenous materials like water is very efficient in the shielding of 
fast neutrons. It slows down the neutrons and the boron present in it absorbs these neutrons. 
Lead is mostly used for the shielding of highly energetic gamma rays. Concrete is also very much effective in the 
shielding of gamma rays. Not all the types of cask possess the outer shell. It only serves as a final containment 
barrier against the release of radioactivity. It is usually made up of stainless steel. The upper lid is a removable 
head with lifting lugs in order to facilitate the easy retrieve ability of spent fuel assemblies. 
 The upper lid is also made up of shielding material to prevent the release of radioactivity. A storage cask is 
usually provided with a basement. This usually consists of concrete [10]. 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
Spent fuels have different burnups along the axial height of the assembly, giving off different levels of heat and 
radiation. In order to analyze the radiation shielding capability of storage casks in practical conditions, the 
shielding analysis should include varying emission ratios along the emission axis In the shielding analysis for a 
single cask, dose rates were evaluated at the external surface of the cask; 1m and 2m away from the cask surface. 
These results can be used as data to control handling time, work procedures, and radiation worker dose rates in 
accordance with then ALARA principle for such work as the installation, visual examination, radiation 
monitoring, and maintenance of casks.  
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For the Single Layered Shielding Analysis, the source term has been considered as line source and relations for 
calculations of dose are defined as follows: 
 
For shielding calculations, it is assumed that cladding provides no gamma attenuation and the shielding is 
exposed equally from all booster elements. The following parameters are used for calculations: 
 
Gamma Energy = E = 0.63 Mev 
Source Height = H= 200 cm 
Source Strength = S = 1.6 x 1010 γ/cm2 . sec 
S=Distance of dose point = R = 12 cm 
Lead shield thickness  = a = 6 cm 
Taylor’s coefficient of Lead = A = 2.007 
α1 = -0.04  
α2 = -0.30 
 
Linear attenuation coefficient = μ = 1.3 cm-1 
 
X1 =  = 6.9 
X2 =  = 9.1 
 
θ1 = θ2 = 80° 
 
Build up flux is found from the following [11]: 
 
 
Using Sievert integral functions, the buildup flux is found to be  
 
 
 
Similarly the build up flux for other energy groups are as follows: 
 
Energy (Mev) Source Strength 
γ/cm. sec 
Build up flux γ/cm2. 
sec 
 
0.63 1.60E+10 1.66E+05 
1.15 4.38E+7 9.03E+03 
1.60 4.25E+6 3.54E+03 
2.05 1.07E+6 1.17E+02 
2.45 9.01E+4 4.65E+01 
2.80 6.53E+3 5.58E+00 
3.30 2.14E+2 1.35E-01 
 
The analysis of dose rates was performed for members of the public outside of the controlled area boundary. In 
particular, this analysis was performed by reflecting a sufficient air-layer to consider the effect of scattering 
radiation caused by the skyshine effect. In this shielding analysis, the self-shielding effect between casks were 
taken into account, because the amount of radiation from the longer side of the array is greater than that of the 
shorter side of the array since there are more casks positioned lengthwise. Thus, the directional orientation of the 
array affects the calculation of the distance to the controlled area boundary. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
A radiation shielding analysis of a metal storage cask, optimized for loading on design basis fuel assemblies, 
under normal storage conditions for a single cask. For the single cask, dose rates were evaluated on the external 
surface of the cask, and at points of one and two meters away from the cask surface. The results of the shielding 
analysis for the single metal cask showed that dose rates were considerably higher at the lower side (from the 
bottom of cask to the bottom of the neutron shielding) of the cask, at over 2mSv/hr at the external surface of the 
cask. Actual dose rates in the controlled area boundary will be lower than 25mrem/yr, due to the decay of 
radioactivity of spent fuel in storage. In particular, if more precise environmental conditions, the shielding 
analysis method and the results of this study will be of value. Thus, in the future, the results of this study will be 
useful for the design and operation of on-site storage facilities or intermediate storage facilities based on a spent 
fuel management strategy. 
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